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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

DEAN W. CROWTHER,
Plaintiff-Appellee
vs.
Utah Court of Appeals #930446-CA
BRYAN MOWER,
Defendant-Appellant

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Statement of the Issues:

1. Whether the trial court erred by granting Appellee's motion for summary
judgment when there was clearly a material factual dispute as to whether
Appellant's mother intended to presently deliver the quitclaim deed that she
1

sent via certified mail from Utah to Appellant while he was in California, and
that such deed was on its face an absolute conveyance, in light of the fact that
if a factfinder ruled that there was a present intent to transfer the deed on her
part, this would have had the legal effect of destroying the joint tenancy with
right of survivorship that Appellant's mother held with Appellee, and thus
would make Appellant and Appellee tenants in common with respect to the
property, and terminate the possibility that Appellee would take the entire
property through Appellee's former right of survivorship when Appellant's
mother died.
2. Whether the trial court erred by summarily ruling that a deed not recorded
by a grantee does not convey to the grantee the grantor's ownership interest in
the property that is the subject of the deed, and thus does not destroy a joint
tenancy with right of survivorship until the deed is recorded.
3. Whether the trial court erred by summarily granting Appellee attorney's fees
even though Appellant was named as the defendant in Appellee's action to
quite title, and Appellant merely showed up in court to argue why Appellant's
deed, conveyed from his mother to him was valid, and Appellant made this
argument in good faith, and defended it very well by both fact and in law.
STANDARD OF REVIEW OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT
The standard of review for whether a summary judgment was properly
granted (and which is therefore, the standard of review for #1, 2, and 3 issues)
is explained in Rule 56 of Utah Code Unannotated page 151. (1993) ". . . the
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party against whom the judgment has been granted is entitled to have all the
facts presented, and all the necessary inferences fairly arising therefrom,
considered in a light most favorable to him." Case law on this matter is
equally clear: "On review of a grant of summary judgment to a Plaintiff, the
inquiry is whether there is any genuine issue as to any material fact, and if
there is not, whether the plaintiffs are entitled to judgment as a matter of law."
Thomcock v. Cook, 604 Rd 934 (Utah 1979). "In reviewing the trial court's
ruling, we accept the facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the
losing party. Because summary judgment is granted as a matter of law, we
may reconsider the trial court's legal conclusions." Winegar v. Froerer Corp.,
813 P.d 104 (Utah 1991) (citing Farmers New World Life Insurance Co. v.
Bountiful City, 803 P.d 1241, 1243 (Utah 1990).

3

Nature of the Case
This is a case involving Appellee's deceased wife, Nellie Crowther, who
while still living, destroyed that couple's joint tenancy with right of
survivorship when she duly conveyed and delivered her interest to the land in
question in this action by means of a quitclaim deed to her son, Mr. Mower
(Appellant). By doing this, she created a tenancy in common by Mr. Mower
and Appellee, which has no rights of survivorship. Appellee claims
the quitclaim deed was invalid due to invalid delivery, which is essential in
deed transactions.

Course of Proceedings
Appellee filed a complaint in Third District Court of Summit County.
Appellee then filed a motion for judgment on the Pleadings with a supporting
memorandum on or about February 2, 1993. Appellant thereafter, filed a
motion for summary judgment and a memorandum in support thereof on or
about February 19, 1993. A rebuttal memora^

:m was filed by Appellee on or

about March 1, 1993. Oral argument before .

.e David S. Young took place

on March 8, 1993. Judge Young entered summary judgment in favor of
Appellee, ruling that the deed in question was invalid because appellant did
not record the deed until after Mrs. Crowther's death. The judge ordered Mr.
Mower to pay attorney's fees in the amount of $1,300.00.
4

Appellant filed a motion for reconsideration and a motion to reconsider
attorney's fees on or about March 17, 1993. Judge Young denied both motions
and filed minute entry on or about April 15, 1993. Appellant filed motion for
findings of fact and conclusions of law on or about May 10, 1993. No response
was filed. This appeal was thereafter filed.

Facts
1.

Appellant Mower is the only son of Nellie D. Crowther whoidied on

August 9, 1991
2.

Appellee was married to Nellie D. Crowther at the time of her de.ath

and was living with her husband, Dean W. Crowther in Salt Lake City, Utah..
3.

On December 15, 1988, Nellie Crowther signed a quitclaim deed

conveying her interest in property located in Summit County, to wit:
The west half of lot 17 and the east half of lot 18, Weberwild
Estates, plat A, a Subdivision as recorded in the office of the County
recorder of Summit County, UT.
to her son, Bryan D. Mower, who at the time was living in Simi Valley,
California. The deed was witnessed by her friend, Mable Hammond, and sent
via certified mail to Mr. Mower along with a letter from Mrs. Crowther's
attorney and a codicil to Mrs. Crowther's original will detailing her action of
the quitclaim deed. The relevant disputed part of that letter is as fojlews:

4.

The quitclaim deed was recorded in Summit County on August 15,
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1991 at the Summit County Court House by Bryan Mower, subsequent to
Nellie Crowther's Death.

Summary of Arguments
1.

The trial court erred by granting Appellee's motion for

summary judgment because there was clearly a material factual dispute as to
whether Appellant's mother intended to presently deliver the quitclaim deed
that she sent via certified mail from Utah to her son, Mr. Mower, while he was
in California. On its face, the deed conveyed absolute ownership of the therein
mentioned property to her son, Mr. Mower. Only a factfinder's ruling that no
valid delivery took place could cause the conveyance of the deed to be found
invalid.
(If the deed were ruled to be duly delivered, the deed would have the
legal effect of destroying the joint tenancy with right of survivorship that
Appellant's mother held with Appellee, and thus would make Appellant and
Appellee tenants in common with respect to the property, and terminate the
possibility that Appellee would take the entire property through Appellee's
former right of survivorship when Appellant's mother died.)

2.

The trial court erred by summarily ruling that a deed not

recorded by a grantee does not convey to the grantee the grantor's ownership
interest in the property that is the subject of the deed, and thus does not destroy
a joint tenancy with right of survivorship until the deed is recorded. The trial
court's application of Utah's recording law was plain error.
3.

The trial court erred by summarily granting Appellee

attorney's fees even though Appellant was named as the Appellant in Appellee's
action to quite title, and Appellant merely showed up in court to argue why
Appellant's deed, conveyed from his mother to him was valid, and Appellant
made this argument in good faith, and defended it very well by both fact and in
law. The trial court's award of attorney's fees were plain error.

Detail of Argument
Point I
A Trial Court's Granting of Summary Judgment
is Improper When a Dispute to a Material Fact Exists
The trial court erred by granting Appellee's motion for summary
judgment because there was clearly a material factual dispute as to whether
Appellant's mother intended to presently deliver the quitclaim deed that she
sent via certified mail from Utah to her son, Mr. Mower, while he was in
California. On its face, the deed conveyed absolute ownership of the therein
mentioned property to her son, Mr. Mower. Only a factfinder's ruling that no
7

valid delivery took place could cause the conveyance of the deed to be found
invalid.
(If the deed were ruled to be effectively delivered, the deed would have
the legal effect of destroying the joint tenancy with right of survivorship that
Appellant's mother held with Appellee, and thus would make Appellant and
Appellee tenants in common with respect to the property, and terminate the
possibility that Appellee would take the entire property through Appellee's
former right of survivorship when Appellant's mother died.)
The Supreme Court of Utah, on at least two occasions, has clearly
stated that a grantor's intent to deliver a deed is not one of law, rather one
of fact. In Horton v. Horton, 695 Rd 102, 106 (Utah 1984) the Court ruled:
Delivery or its absence is a question of fact."

See also: Poulson v. Poulson,

672 Rd 97, 99 (Utah 1983). In light of these rulings by the Utah Supreme
Court, the trial judge was clearly wrong by granting summary judgment on the
factual issue concerning Nellie Crowther's intent to transfer ownership when
she conveyed her property to her son, Mr. Mower.
Nellie Crowther, Mr. Mower's mother, delivered a deed to Mr. Mower
via certified mail that gave all her interest in the property described therein to
Mr. Mower. However, Appellee wants to have this conveyance ruled void for
what he claims was a lack of Nellie Crowther's intent to deliver the deed to
Mr. Mower, again, a factual issue.
In the Judge's minute entry in which he explains why he granted
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summary judgment, the judge states: The court has found that there was
lacking a present intent [by Mr. Mower's mother] to sever the joint
tenancy!,] and thus the latter filing of the deed [by Mr. Mower] was
ineffective to convey an interest to [Mr. Mower.] See: Minute Entry Ruling
4-501 UCJA, p.l., attached. (Exhibit A) Because, according to the trial
court, summary judgment was granted because of the factual finding by the
Judge that Mrs. Crowther lacked a necessary present intent to deliver a deed to
her son, the case should be overruled as a matter law because this clearly
indicates that a dispute over a material factual issue was present and should
have been decided by a fact finder after a proper trial had been held.
In the hearing held by Judge Young on Appelleefs motion for summary
judgment, Judge Young made several factual findings that were inappropriate
for the granting of a summary judgment:
1. "If it were her intent that you [own] the property[,] at [the time she sent
you the deed,] it should have been filed immediately." (This was in reference
to the fact the Mr. Mower did not record the deed until Nellie Crowther died.)
See relevant hearing transcript p.6 attached.
2. "She gave you this deed[,] but you were told not to record the deed." Id.
p.5. (The judge was referring to a comment made by Nellie Crowther's
attorney in a letter sent to Mr. Mower. However, the letter actually says "If
she dies [before Appellee] you should promptly record it." Appellant asserts
this was merely advice, or precatory language, not a condition precedent to

9

receiving ownership of the property. See letter, exhibit B, middle of second
paragraph of the body of the letter. Also precatory language is defined as
having the nature of prayer, request, or entreaty; " . . . conveying or embodying
a recommendation or advice or the expression of a wish, but not a positive
command or direction." Diver v. Hendrix, 284 P.d 1080, 1083.
3. "I thought the letter in correspondence from the attorney said vtalk to me[.]
[I]f she dies first, talk to me first.1" Id. p. 6. This is also in reference to the
just mentioned paragraph in the letter described as exhibit B that the court used
to establish Nellie had no intent to transfer ownership until Appellee died.
Not only are these findings of material facts inappropriate in a hearing
for a motion for summary judgment, Mr. Mower asserts they are not correct for
these reasons:
1. The deed was absolute on its face. And the deed is the best means
available to establish the parties' intent. Sweeny v. Sweeny, H ^Ad 806 (Conn.
1940). Also the deed was executed before the letter from Nellie Crowther's
attorney was even written.
2. The letter sent to Mr. Mower, exhibit B, by Nellie Crowther's attorney, also
says, "Acting upon your mother's request I am forwarding the two deeds to
you, to complete the transaction by which she transfers ownership to you.
The return receipt will show that you have received the two deeds, in case any
question of delivery should ever arise." (Emphasis added.) See Exhibit B
paragraph 3.)
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There was clearly a dispute between what the Appellee and the judge
thought Nellie Crowther's intent was, and what Mr. Mower thought it was.
The Judge seems to have blinding gone along with Appellee's initial remarks
that the intent of Nellie Crowther was undisputed and not material—initial
remarks which were simply ludicrous. Appellee stated: In this case your
honor, there are no undisputed material facts. . . . there are absolutely no
controverted facts. . . and certainly no material facts. See p.3 of the hearing
transcript. Despite this statement by Appellee to the judge, Nellie Crowther's
intent to transfer ownership was obviously very much disputed as established
by Mr. Mower's reasons above, and should have been ruled upon be a fact
finder after a proper trial.
Moreover, by reading the judge's minute entry, it is obvious that the
judge's granting of summary judgment turned on the judge's determination that
Nellie Crowther had no intent to deliver the deed to Mr. Mower, her son.
Therefore, because the granting of the motion of summary judgment turned on
this issue, it was certainly a material fact.
Furthermore, Appellee, in his motion for summary disposition on appeal
states this: "The issue is whether this equivocable delivery of the quitclaim
deed by Nellie's attorney to [Appellant] and the failure to record the same prior
to her death constituted a valid delivery as against the joint tenant." Because
this issue of "equivocable delivery," one of fact, by Appellee's own admission,
the case should go to a factfinder, and should not have been summarily
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disposed of.
The granting of the summary judgment in favor of the appellee,
turned on an issue of fact, not of law, therefore, the granting of the motion for
summary judgment should be overruled because in order for a nonmoving party
to successfully oppose a motion for summary judgment and send the issue to a
factfinder, it is not necessary for the party to prove its legal theory; it is only
necessary for the nonmoving party to show facts that controvert those of the
moving party's. Salt Lake City Corp. v. James Constructors Inc., 761 P.d 42
(Utah Ct. App. 1988). Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings,
depositions, affidavits, admissions . . . show there is no genuine issue of
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. Utah R.Civ.P. 56(c). It has been established that the intent of Nellie
Crowther was disputed and material.
Point II
A Deed Not Recorded by a Grantee Does Not Effect the
Validity of the Conveyance Between the Grantor and the Grantee:
Rather the Recording of a Deed is Merely to Impart Notice to a
Subsequent
Bonafide Purchaser for Value
The trial court erred by summarily ruling that a deed not recorded by a
grantee does not convey to the grantee the grantor's ownership interest in the
property that is the subject of the deed, and thus does not destroy a joint
tenancy with right of survivorship until the deed is recorded.
This point is well entrenched in the United States common law: "It is
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the rule with deeds as in the case of other instruments affecting the tile to land,
that a deed, otherwise valid, passes title from the grantor to the grantee
although it has not been recorded."1 The execution and delivery of a deed
passes the estate and interest in the premises, the same as livery of seisin at
common law.2 Recording adds nothing to its effectiveness as a conveyance; all
that it accomplishes is to impart notice, and after its acceptance, failure to
record the deed will not revest title in the grantor.3 Despite diligent and
exhaustive efforts by Mr. Mower to find authority for the Court's ruling, no
Utah case law or statutory authority has been found that points up to the
proposition that the conveyance from Nellie Crowther to Mr. Mower should be
ruled void because Mr. Mower did not record the conveyance until after the
death of his mother, Nellie Crowther.
Utah law is very clear that one who conveys an interest in property by
quitclaim deed conveys "all right, title, interest, and estate of the grantor in and
to the premises therein described and all rights, privileges and appurtenances
thereunto belonging, at the date of such conveyance." Utah Code Annotated
section 57-1-13 (1992 edition). Had the legislature wanted to limit the
validity of transfers by quitclaim deed to only those quitclaim-deed transfers
x

Manfield v. Excelsior Ref. Co. , 135 U.S. 326; Burbank v.
Conrad, 96 U.S. 291; Warnock v. Harlow, 96 Cal 298, 31 P 166;
Hallett v. Alexander, 50 Colo. 37, 114 P 490. All of this is
still good law. They have all been Shepardized.
2

See 23 Am Jur d, Deeds sections 76 et seq.

3

Lake v. Weaver, 74 A 451; J.C. Engelman Land Co. v. La
Blanco Agri. Co., 239 SW 937, 21 A.L.R. 1535.
13

that were subsequently recorded, the legislature had the ability to do so. They
did not; creating, at least, the implication that they did not want recordation to
be a condition upon quitclaim transfers.
This general principle of conveyances binding the parties to the
transaction even if they are not subsequently recorded is well stated in Bekins
Bar V Ranch v. Beryl Baptist Church of Beryl Iron County, 642 P.d 371 (Utah
1982). "A conveyance of real property is valid and binding between parties
even without recordation." Therefore, the unrecorded transfer by Nellie
Crowther to her son, Appellant, Bryan Mower, is valid even though Bryan
Mower did not record the transfer until his mother, Nellie Crowther, died.
Mr. Mower did not record the deed his mother, Nellie Crowther, sent
him until she died. The judge made various erroneous legal statements about
the legal consequences effected by Mr. Mower's waiting to record the deed:
"If I . . . property with my wife, and I give you a deed to the property, just as
your mother did, and then I die before that deed is recorded, by operation of
law my property has gone to my survivor because there was never any deed
recorded in the interim. So it has already gone to her before and then you go
down and record your deed, you're out of luck." Hearing transcript p.6.
Mr. Mower responded by telling the judge the following: It was
entirely 100% up to me when I recorded this deed. I could have recorded it
then, I could have recorded it subsequent to my mother's death, any time I
wanted to. Again, it was [merely] at the attorney's suggestion [that I not record
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the deed until my mother's death]." Id. p.7. Mr. Mower also stated: I don't
think a summary disposition should be offered to the Appellee due to the fact
that [the deed], in fact, was signed [by my mother], it is a legal document
before the letter [that my mother had her attorney write to me] even occurred.
Id. p.3.
Judge Young responded: [The deed you have] is a floating deed. It is out
there floating in the world somewhere, but it is never recorded against the
property. And so at the time [you recorded it after your mother's death] the
grantor no longer owned the property. . . . Now at the time you [recorded]
your deed in this property, it had already gone from Nellie to Dean Crowther
by her death by operation of [the] law [of joint tenancy with the right of
survivorship.] Id. p.4.
Judge Young was wrong because when Nellie Crowther died, the
interest she held with Appellee as joint tenants with rights of survivorship
terminated when she conveyed her interest in the property to her son, Mr.
Mower. The law on this area is very clear and well rooted in American
jurisprudence. A joint tenancy with right of survivorship is created when there
is unity of time, title, interest and possession exist. Merrick v. Peterson, 606
P.d 700 (Wash App. 1980). However, "Conveyance by one joint tenant of his
or her interest severs joint tenancy, transforming it into tenancy in common,
thereby extinguishing right of survivorship." Lyon v. Lyon, 670 P.d 272
(Wash. 1983); Jolley v, Corry, 671 Rd 139 (Utah 1983).
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Therefore, when Judge Young said: . . . at the time you [recorded]
your deed in this property, it had already gone from Nellie to Dean Crowther
by her death by operation of [the] law [of joint tenancy with the right of
survivorship,] he was wrong. When Nellie Crowther conveyed her interest to
her son, Mr. Mower, by a quitclaim deed that was absolute on its face as to
giving him all her interest, Appellee's joint tenancy and right of survivorship
was destroyed. Mr. Mower had become a tenant in common with Appellee
when he was conveyed the property, two and 1/2 years before Nellie Crowther
even died.
This is true even though the deed was not recorded by Mr. Mower until
after Nellie Crowther's death. "The intention of recording acts is to require
persons claiming an interest in real property to record such interests as will
give notice of their claims." Chelan County v. Wilson, 744 P.d 1106 (Wash
App. 1987). This decision goes on to state " . . . unrecorded conveyances are
valid as between parties."

Moreover, Appellee asserted that Mr. Bryan Mower should not be
awarded the property conveyed to him by quitclaim deed because there was an
invalid delivery from Bryan Mower's mother to Bryan Mower. However,
Appellee errs in this assertion. The deed that Nellie Crowther conveyed to Mr.
Mower, her son, was absolute on its face: "Nellie D. Crowther grantor . . .
hereby quitclaims to Bryan Mower grantee . . . the west 1/2 of lot 17 and the
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east 1/2 of lot 18, Weber Wild Estates Subdivision." Nellie Crowther also had
the deed witnessed and notarized by a Utah notary public. ("Exhibit C" hereto
attached.) The moment she did this and sent her son, Bryan Mower, the deed,
her interest in the above-described property ended, severing the joint tenancy
with right of survivorship held by her and Appellee. By giving her son a deed
that conveyed absolute ownership of all her interest in the questioned property
on its face, Utah law recognized Bryan Mower as the sole owner of her former
interest. Utah Code Annotated 57-1-13. And the joint tenancy with right of
survivorship ended. The deed clearly passed beyond Nellie Crowther's "control
or domain" as required by Utah law in order for there to be a valid delivery.
Wiggle v. Cheney, 597 Rd 135L 1352 (Utah 1979).
Wiggle is one of Appellee's primary cited authorities. However, a look
at the facts clearly indicate Wiggle is not on point and supports Mr. Bryan
Mower's assertion that title indeed passed because a valid delivery was
effected. In Wiggle, the Court held that where, following disposition of deed,
grantor advised her executor that his name was on a safe deposit box and
instructed him that upon her death, he was to go to the bank where he would
be granted access to the safe deposit box and its contents, grantor remained in
sole possession and control in deed in question until her death and, thus,
subsequent manual delivery of deed by executor to grantee conveyed no title to
property described therein, or any part thereof, or any of its contents. These
facts are a far cry from the case at hand: Nellie Crowther had a quitclaim deed
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notarized, and witnessed, then sent the deed to her son, Mr. Mower, by
certified mail to ensure it would be duly delivered. She lived in Utah at the
time and so mailing the deed was the only way to deliver it to Mr. Mower, in
California. She used the best possible delivery means available to her under
the circumstances short of paying someone to fly to California and hand deliver
the deed. After this delivery of the quitclaim deed that by its terms conveys
absolutely all her ownership in the property, she retained no right to "reclaim
or recall" her property interest, which is all she was required to do to effect a
valid delivery. Hanns v. Hanns, 423 Rd 499, 509 (Oregon 1967).
Had Nellie Crowther wanted to maintain control over the property until
she died, she certainly could have deposited the

deed with an escrow agent,

which is what many people do when they want to ensure conditions are
satisfied before deliver occurs. Chillemi v. Chillemi, 78 A.2d 750 (Md. 1951).
Even preferred, she could have written the ostensible "conditions" right in the
deed itself, insuring complete control until she died, which she chose not to do.
She was well aware that this option was available to her because in another
deed granted by her to her son also in a quit-claim fashion, she included these
words of limitation: Nellie D. Crowther grantor . . . hereby quit-claims to
Bryan Mower . . . Lot 7, Block 1, Rockwood Subdivision . . . Reserving,
however, to Dean W. Crowther [Appellee] a lifetime right to occupy the
premises."
The only way that Mr. Mower may legally not have any interest in the
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property would be if Nellie Crowther did not have the intent to convey her
ownership in the property to Mr. Mower. Again, in Judge Young's minute
entry, he focused on the fact that Judge Young believed Nellie Crowther did
not have the intent to deliver the deed to Mr. Mower. However, this is a
question for a factfinder, not one for a judge ruling on a motion for summary
judgment.
Point IH
Attorney's Fees Are not Appropriate Unless Bad Faith Ensued

The trial court erred by summarily granting Appellee attorney's fees
even though Appellant was named as the Appellant in Appellee's action to
quite title because Appellant merely showed up in court to argue why
Appellant's deed, conveyed from his mother to him was valid, and Appellant
made this argument in good faith, and defended it very well by both fact and in
law.

The trial court erred by summarily granting Appellee attorney's fees
even though Appellant was named as the Appellant in Appellee's action to
quite title, and Appellant merely showed up in court to argue why Appellant's
deed, conveyed from his mother to him was valid, and Appellant made this
argument in good faith, and defended it very well by both fact and in law.
Utah Code Annotated Section 78-27-56 allows for attorney's
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fees for frivolous lawsuits. Appellant's actions were meritorious: 1) Appellant
tried in good faith to
settle this action, but Appellee breached the settlement agreement. See
"Exhibit D" (This exhibit is the settlement trust that Appellee as settlor would
put the property in question into an irrevocable trust for the beneficiary,
Appellant, Bryan Mower, and was prepared by Appellee's previous attorney);
2) Because of Appellee's breach of the settlement contract with Appellant,
Appellant had no reasonable alternative other than to protect his legally
conveyed and transferred property from his mother to him; 3) It is evident
from the legal analysis in Appellant's Motion for Reconsideration and
Appellant's answer for Appellee's request for Summary Judgment (see attached
pleadings) that there is ample statutory and case law to support Appellant's
position.
Wherefore, premises considered, Judge Young's granting of Appellee's
motion for summary judgment should be overruled because a disputed and
material fact was clearly present when he made his ruling, and as a matter of
law, Mr. Mower was a cotenant with Appellee when his mother conveyed her
interest in the property to him. The attorney's fees granted were an abuse of
discretion because Mr. Mower's defense was asserted in good faith and was
well grounded in both fact and law. Appellant should, therefore, prevail on all
three issues.
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Conclusion
Utah law states that a summary judgment can not be granted if there is
any genuine issue of fact. There clearly are issues of fact clearly brought forth.
In addition, the court erred by summarily ruling that a deed not
recorded by a grantee does not convey to the grantee the grantor's ownership
interest in the property that is the subject of the deed in question, and thus does
not destroy a joint tenancy with right of survivorship until the deed is recorded.
Utah law is very clear that one who conveys an interest in property by
quitclaim deed conveys "all right, title, interest and estate of the grantor in and
to the premises therein. Recording only serves notice.
Mrs. Crowther's intent was to leave her interest in the property as
indicated by the deed, the letter from Mr. Wharton (Mrs. Crowther's attorney)
and her own codicil (Exhibit E) to her will.
This court should give full force and effect to all provisions of the Utah
Laws, cited above, and reverse the District Court's original decision.
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A
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SUHHIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
DEAN W. CROWTHER
Plaintiff,
vs.

MINUTE ENTRY
RULING 4-501 UCJA

BRYAN D. MOWER
Defendant.

CASE # 92-11621

The Defendant has recently filed a "Motion for Reconsideration" arguing
again his position that when his Mother, through counsel, sent a letter to Mr.
Mower containing certain documents including a Quit Claim Deed herein relevant,
that she at that time intended to sever the joint tenancy she held with her
husband. The court has found that she did not have such present intent to do so
as evidenced by the instructions from counsel as follows:
As you know, your Mother wanted to be sure that you receive a
1/2 interest in her property; her intention is to leave the other 1/2 to
her step-children. There are two possible chain of events—either
your Mother dies before her husband does, or she dies after he does.
If she dies first, you should promptly, as soon as it is possible,
record the two deeds with the respective County Recorder. If your
step-father dies first, I would suggest you contact me (after you've
discussed matters with your Mother), (emphasis added)
The court has found that there was lacking a present intent to sever the
joint tenancy and t h u s the later filing of the deed was ineffective to convey an
interest to the plaintiff.

The court t h u s denies the Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration. Mr. Richie
is requested to prepare an order consistent herewith.
Dated, April 14, 1993.

u
David S. Young, Judge
c.c. to Mr. Mower, pro se, and Mr. Richie

h
UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC.
124 SOUTH 400 EAST • 4TH FLOOR
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111
{801) 328-8891

WATS

1-800-662-4245

December 16, 1988

fan Mower
54 Acapulco Crt.
ni Valley, California

93065

ar Mr. Mower:
Enclosed are the originals of three documents: a) a
Lt-claim Deed regarding the house at 2620 Elizabeth Street in
Lt Lake City; b) a Quit-claim Deed regarding some recreational
Dperty in Summit County; and c) a Codicil to your Mother's Will.
sp them in a safe place.
As you know, your Mother wanted.to be sure that you
ceive a 1/2 interest in her property; her intention is to leave
e other 1/^ to her step-children. There are two possible chain
events — 'either your Mother dies before her husband does, or
e dies after he does. If she dies first, you should promptly, as
on as it is possible, record the two deeds with the respective
•unty Recorder. If your step-father dies first, I would suggest
>u contact me (after you've discussed matters with your Mother),
will need to know whether Dean Crowther did anything to affect
alter the ownership or testamentary disposition of his portion
the property, before we can decide what needs to be done with
e Deeds.
You will have noticed, no doubt, that this letter
rived by Certified Mail, Return Receipt Requested. Acting upon
ur Mother's request, I am forwarding the two Deeds to you, to
>mplete the transaction by which she transfers ownership to you.
.e Return Receipt will show that you have received the two Deeds,
i case any question of delivery should ever arise. A copy of this
itter, together with the Return Receipt, is in your Mother's file

Bryan Mower
Page 2
December 16, 1988
here (our #88-02390). Earlier in this letter I asked you to keep
the documents in a safe place -- please keep this letter with them,
as an indication of your Mother!s intention to deliver the deeds
and how that was accomplished.
Please call me if any questions arise.
Very truly yours,

W. PAUL WHARTON
Attorney at Law
SENIOR CITIZEN LAW CENTER
WPW/bj
cc:

Nellie D. Crowther
c/o Mable Hammond

Enclosures
Certified Mail Receipt No.: P07 5787592

^J

S/Anov^

ov. &<*<*&

When r e c o r d e d , r e t u r n t o :

($uit-<£latm Beth
THIS IS A LEGALLY BINDING CONTRACT
IF NOT UNDERSTOOD, SEEK COMPETENT ADVICE
NELLIE DEE CROWTHER, Grantor, of 2620 Elizabeth
Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84106, hereby QUIT-CLAIMS to
BRYAN MOWER, Grantee, of 1564 Acapulco Street, Simi
Valley, California 93065,
for the sum of TEN DOLLARS and other good and valuable consideration, the following described tract of land in Summit
County, State of Utah:
^The West 1/2 of Lot 17 and the East 1/2 of
Lot 18 Weber Wild Estates Subdivision,
r,
WITNESS the hand of the said grantor this /:_YJ
/('<<<>...
fi..<-^
1988.

of

day

NELLIE DEE CROWTHER
STATE OF UTAH
ss,
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE
1988, personally
On the I S ^ day of JTXi-"-->fc^
appeared before me, a Notary Public, NELLIE DEE CROWTHER
who proved to me her identity through documentary evidence in
the form of yyr- ^ x w ^ e w ^ e ^ ^ 5 > ^ r ^ v ^ —
to be
the" p^rspy^ whose name is signed on the preceding document, who
duly1acknowledged to me that she executed the same.
-

.^

4

"-'V,

i

NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing at:

•. o;. •.

*My;'Cosmmi(6SioH -expires:

MS1*

62G«M1S4
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DRAFT COPY
I.

IRREVOCABLE ADDENDUM TO THE DEAN WALTER CROWTHER FAMILY TRUST

DEAN WALTER CROWTHER as Trustor and as the Trustee hereby
makes an irrevocable addition to the DEAN WALTER CROWTHER FAMILY
TRUST, dated the 30th day of March, 1992.
It is the Trustor's intent that the Trust, its provisions,
assets, and contents, remain private, and that their be no
disputations with respect to this ADDENDUM. If any Beneficiary
hereunder in any manner, directly or indirectly, contests or
attacks this ADDENDUM, or the TRUST, or any of their provisions,
any share or interest in the Trust Estate given in this ADDENDUM to
that contesting Beneficiary is revoked and disposition thergof
shall be made in the same manner provided herein as if that
contesting Beneficiary had never been named herein.
All Personal Property is to be distributed as provided in the
Trust. Personal Property or its value is not to be considered in
determining the individual share of the balance of the Trust
Estate.
After the distribution of all Personal Property as provided in
the Trust and its schedules, the Balance of the Trust Estate shall
be divided and distributed:
One Fourth (1/4) to Brian Mower if living, otherwise to his
heirs.
Three Fourths (3/4) to remain in the DEAN WALTER CROWTHER
FAMILY TRUST.
For the purpose of dividing and distributing the One Fourth
(1/4) of the Balance of the Trust Estate, the Trustor hereby
appoints FIRST SECURITY BANK N.A., and its successors, as Successor
Trustee. After the division and distribution, the provisions of
the Trust prior to this ADDENDUM are to be implemented, including
those applicable to Successor Trustee.
That this ADDENDUM is accepted and effected this
; 19
TRUSTOR:

TRUSTEE:

DEAN WALTER CROWTHER

DEAN WALTER CROWTHER

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)
: ss.
)

day of

FIRST CODICIL TO THE
LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT OF
NELLIE D. CROWTHER
I, NELLIE D. CROWTHER, of Salt Lake County, State of
Utah, being at least eighteen years of age, of sound mind and
memory, and acting under no restraint or duress of any kind, do
hereby make, publish and declare this instrument to be the FIRST
CODICIL to my Last Will and Testament executed on the 11th of
August, 1987, at Salt Lake County, Utah, and do hereby republish
said Will with the following change:
The second paragraph of the section entitled "RESIDUARY
LEGATEES" is revised in its entirety to read as follows:
In the event that DEAN W. CROWTHER does not survive me,
I give all of the rest, residue and remainder of my property,
whether real, personal or mixed, and wherever situated, together
with any property over which I may have power of appointment to my
son and step-daughters, named above, as follows:

I have by

Quit-claim Deed, given to my son one-half of my home and other
real property; I hereby give the other half of each, if I have
received an interest by the probate of DEAN W. CROWTHER1s estate
or otherwise, to my three step-daughters.

All of the rest of my

estate I give to the four children, share and share alike.

In the

event that one or more of my children predecease me, each deceased
child's share of my estate shall be equally divided among that
child's children.

d?^
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